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Abstract: Why economic performance and macroeconomic stability has differed among the BRICs countries? 
More specifically, in which way macroeconomic policy regime and the management of the economic policy 
has defined an economic environment that has contributed for a higher (or lower) economic performance and 
macroeconomic stability in the BRICs countries? The main objective of this paper is to analyse the 
relationship between exchange rate regime, capital account convertibility and economic performance within 
the big emerging countries that constitute what has been called BRIC – Brazil, Russia, India and China. The 
hypothesis of the paper is that economic performance of these countries is the result, at least partially, of the 
quality of the macroeconomic policy management adopted in each country, in which exchange rate policy, 
capital account convertibility and the degree of external vulnerability plays a key role. 
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Resumo: Porque o desempenho econômico e a estabilidade macroeconômica têm diferido entre os países do 
BRIC? Mais especificamente, de que modo o regime de política macroeconômica e o gerenciamento da 
política econômica têm definido um ambiente econômico que tem contribuído para um maior (ou menor) 
desempenho econômico entre os países do BRIC? O principal objetivo deste artigo é analisar a relação entre 
regime cambial, conversibilidade da conta de capital e desempenho econômico entre os grandes países que 
constituem o chamado BRIC - Brasil, Russia, India e China. A hipótese básica é que o desempenho 
econômico desses países resulta, ao menos parcialmente, da qualidade da administração da política 
macroeconômica adotada em cada país, no qual a política cambial, a conversibilidade da conta de capital e o 
grau de vulnerabilidade externa desempenham um papel crucial. 
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In October 2003, a Goldman and Sachs’ report (Purushothaman and Wilson, 2003), using the 
demographic projections and a model of capital accumulation and productivity growth, mapped out GDP 
growth, income per capita and currency movements of the BRICs countries (Brazil, Russia, India and China) 
until 2050. Based in some assumptions, the report forecasted that in less than 40 years the BRICs countries 
together could be larger than the G6 in US dollar terms and by 2025 they could account for over half for the 
size of the G6 (currently they are worth less than 15%). However, as the report recognizes, there is no 
guarantee that the economic growth of these countries will reach what is forecasted by the study, as such 
behaviour depends on a set of factors, which includes macro stability (understood as price stability), 
development of good institutions (legal system, functioning markets, educational systems, financial 
institutions etc.), openness to trade and FDI, and improvement in education degree of the population – a very 
known development policies supported by multilateral institutions, such as World Bank. 
Although such sort of forecast is exposed to criticism, there is no doubt that due to their geographic 
and population size and GDP dimension (current and potential), in spite of the problems of social inequality 
and even poverty that the BRICs countries face nowadays, one cannot disregard the importance and 
potentiality of theses economies. Looking at the GDP growth performance of the BRICs countries, since 1990, 
one can see that GDP growth has differed among the countries: average GDP growth in China in 1990-2006 
was 9.8%, in India 6.1%, Brazil 2.2% and Russia -0.1%. If we compare the BRICs countries only in the recent 
period (1999-2006), that is after the 1998’s Russian crisis, the economic performance changes somehow: 9.3% 
in China, 6.8% in India, 6.7% in Russia and 2.8% in Brazil.  
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Why economic performance and macroeconomic stability
1 has differed among the BRICs countries? 
More specifically, in which way macroeconomic policy regime and the management of the economic policy 
has defined an economic environment that has contributed for a higher (or lower) economic performance and 
macroeconomic stability of the BRICs countries? 
                                                 
1 For the purpose of this paper, we define macroeconomic stability as a broader concept than just price stabilization, as it aims 
at reducing the uncertainties that are intrinsic to the business world in order to provide a favourable environment for 
investment and production decisions. Macroeconomic stability can also be defined as a situation of sustained economic growth 
with financial stability, that is with inflation under control and with low likehood of financial/currency crises. See more, on this 
concern, Oreiro and Paula (2007, section 2). 
  1The paper aims at analyzing the relationship between exchange rate regime, capital account 
convertibility and economic performance within the big emerging countries that constitute what has been 
called BRIC – Brazil, Russia, India and China, during the period of capital account liberalisation that has 
happened in broader terms since beginning of the 1990s. The main hypothesis developed in the paper is that 
economic performance of BRICs countries is the result, at least partially, of the quality of the macroeconomic 
policy management adopted in each country, in which exchange rate policy, capital account convertibility and 
the degree of external vulnerability play a key role.  
The paper is divided in three sections, besides the Introduction. Section 2 discusses the relationship 
between capital account convertibility, exchange rate regime and macroeconomic stability in emerging 
countries, while section 3 focuses the analysis on the recent experience of each BRIC country. Section 4 
compares briefly such experiences and seeks to extract some conclusions. 
 
2. Exchange rate regimes, capital controls and macroeconomic stability 
 
One important discussion in the literature about macroeconomic issues in emerging countries is which 
exchange rate regime is more appropriate for these countries. On one hand, according to the ‘bipolar’ view 
intermediary regimes – that involve all sorts of intermediary exchange rate regimes, that is between freely 
floating regime and fixed exchange rate regime – are less appropriate for economies with substantial 
involvement in international capital markets. The main argument is that such exchange rate regimes make 
countries more vulnerable to speculative attacks (Fischer, 2001). On the other hand, the view called ‘fear of 
floating’ points out that many emerging countries that adopt flexible exchange rate regime in practice seek to 
limit exchange rate movements. Such resistance to floating arises from their low policy and institutional 
credibility and high degree of pass-through of exchange rate changes into domestic prices, among other 
factors (Calvo and Reihart, 2002). Other reasons to why monetary authorities avoid exchange rate movements 
are related to the effects of excessive exchange rate volatility (mainly devaluation) on the outstanding foreign 
currency debts of banks and the corporate sectors with unhedged foreign currency liabilities. In addition, 
exchange rate fluctuations may generate uncertainties that could impede trade. For instance, prolonged real 
appreciation associated with large capital inflows can adversely affect export competitiveness and investment 
in the external sector. 
Fixed exchange regime has the advantage of eliminating the exchange rate risk that affects the 
decisions of exporters and importers and domestic borrowers in international financial markets, and also 
converging domestic inflation to external inflation. However, such regime has also high risks for bigger 
emerging countries, as its results in the lost of economic policy flexibility to face external shocks, mainly 
when economic authorities does not have enough exchange reserves to intervene in the exchange market 
and/or there is a confidence crisis associated to the lack of government capability in maintaining the pegged 
exchange rate; under these conditions, the adjustment costs can be very high. Fixed exchange rate may 
encourage borrowers to be too confident in taking out foreign-exchange-denominated loans, doing very 
painful any change in the exchange rate regime.
2
One could argue that the adoption of a freely flexible exchange regime by emerging countries could 
isolate these countries from speculative attacks on domestic currency as government has no commitment with 
any level of exchange rate. Besides, floating exchange regime could increase the autonomy of monetary 
policy, overcoming the ‘impossible trinity’ that says that a country cannot have at the same time capital 
account convertibility, fixed exchange rate regime and monetary policy autonomy in order to achieve 
domestic objectives. However, floating exchange regime frequently works in the real world differently from 
what is supposed in the textbooks. According to Grenville (2000), fundamentals cannot explain the behaviour 
of exchange rate over a short/medium term horizon, that is exchange rate have at times exhibited long-lived 
swings with no apparent changes in fundamentals significant enough to justify them. The problems related to 
the exchange rate volatility are greater for emerging countries, as they have: (i) no long historical experience 
                                                 
2 Mohanty and Scatigna (2005, p.19), using the IMF’s de facto classification of exchange rate regimes report that the number 
of emerging countries opting for a flexible exchange rate has risen from a little above 15% in 1990 to about one half at the end 
of 2001, while the share of hard peg regimes increased moderately from under 10% at little above 15% during the same period, 
and intermediate regime has fallen from over three quarters to less than 35%. Reihart and Rogoff (2002), however, using 
another classification based on parallel exchange market activity and other special features, concluded that many emerging 
economies have in effect crawling peg regimes.  
  2of market-determined exchange rate; (ii) few Friedmanite stabilizers speculators acting in the exchange 
market, that is there has been a lack of players willing take contrarian foreign exchange positions in emerging 
countries; and (iii) much larger and volatile capital flows, in relation to the size of their capital markets and 
economies more generally (Grenville, 2000). According to Ho and McCauley’s data (2003), despite of the 
rapid growth in activity during the 1990s, foreign exchange markets in most emerging countries continue to be 
relatively small and less liquidity than their counterparts in the industrial world. This suggests that emerging 
foreign exchange markets are more prone to one-sided bets and instability, because they are thin and subject to 
a high degree of uncertainty and information asymmetries (Moreno, 2005, p.10).  
Flexibility in the operation of floating exchange regimes can be helpful in absorbing the capital inflow, 
in buffering external shocks, and responding to the changing productive capacity of emerging economies; it 
can also inhibit some short-term flows, by serving as a constant reminder that exchange rate volatility can 
outweigh the interest rate advantage of foreign currency borrowings (Grenville, 2000, p.59). Some sort of 
managed floating exchange rates regime can be useful if the objective of the central bank is to reduce the 
exchange rate volatility and also influence somehow the real exchange rate for international trade purposes. 
Central bank intervenes in foreign exchange markets to achieve a variety of macroeconomic objectives, such 
as controlling inflation, maintaining external competitiveness and/or maintaining financial stability. 
Differently from a pegged exchange rate, authorities’ interventions to limit exchange rate movements may not 
target a certain level of the exchange rate, allowing nominal exchange rate to float in order to disincentivise 
speculative capital flows  but may influence its path. The preservation of a competitive and stable real 
exchange rate can be use as an intermediate target of macroeconomic policies oriented to employment and 
growth objectives.
3
In order to enhance the possibility of a successful management of exchange rate regime in emerging 
markets can be necessary some measures to reduce the volatility of capital flows and the likehood of 
speculation attack on domestic currency. One possibility is the use of official intervention in the foreign 
exchange market, that may exert direct influence on nominal exchange rate as it alters the relative supply of 
domestic and foreign currency assets. On one hand, the countries’ ability to resist currency depreciation is 
limited by its stock of foreign exchange reserves and its access to potential credit lines. Reserve accumulation 
can be seen as an insurance against future negative shocks and speculation against domestic currency, as 
emerging economies have limited access to international capital market. On other hand, the ability to avoid 
currency appreciation may require the use of sterilised intervention. The accumulation of reserves requires 
some sort of financing due to the excess of foreign currency reserves over domestic currency in circulation. 
The central bank can finance this gap by issuing domestic monetary liabilities. If central banks have a target 
for the short-term rate, then they can attempt to offset increases in bank reserves selling domestic assets or 
issuing their own securities (Mohanty and Turner, 2006). 
There are some concerns about the prolonged use of foreign exchange intervention to resist currency 
appreciation. One concern is related to the fact that a large portfolio currency asset exposes the central bank to 
potential valuation losses for currency appreciation. A second concern is related to the carrying costs of 
reserves, that are determined by the difference between the return on domestic assets and foreign assets.
4 
Finally, continuous reserve accumulation might at some point raise problems for the central bank in 
controlling monetary growth. The assessment of the recent experience of exchange reserve accumulation in 
emerging countries shows evidences that such countries have so far been successful in sterilising reserve 
operations (Mohanty and Scatigna, 2004; Mohanty and Turner, 2006). On one hand, carrying costs have been 
low or even negative in an important number of countries (including China, India and South Korea), although 
they have been high in some countries (Brazil and Indonesia). On the other hand, many central banks may 
have used reserve accumulation to expand the monetary base to deliberately ease monetary policy in an 
environment of low inflation and large excess capacity. Due to the effectiveness of official foreign exchange 
                                                 
3 According to Frenkel (2006, p.579), “a competitive RER [real exchange rate] involves the distortion of domestic relative 
prices in favor of tradable activities against nontradable activities: the combination of higher protection for local activities that 
compete with imports with a higher competitiveness for export activities. Consequently, the RER affects the employment 
growth rate in the long run due to its influence on the output growth rate, through its incentive on investment in tradable 
activities that accelerates productivity growth and generates positive externalities in other sectors”.  
4 Cost of sterilisation is calculated as the spread between the domestic and the US one-year Treasury bill rate, applied to the 
total outstanding stock of foreign exchange reserves in domestic currency. 
  3intervention and low inflation environment, real exchange rate have not risen significantly (or even fallen) in 
many countries with large and persistent current account surplus. 
Another possibility to enhance the management of exchange rate regime (that is not excluding with 
official intervention) in emerging countries is the use ‘capital management techniques’ that includes ‘capital 
controls’, that is norms that manage volume, composition, and/or allocation of international private capital 
flows, and/or ‘prudential domestic financial regulations’, that refer to policies, such as capital-adequacy 
standards, reporting requirements, or restrictions on the ability and terms under which domestic financial 
institutions can provide to certain types of projects (Epstein et al, 2003, p.6-7). Capital controls can be used 
for different sometimes related objectives, such as (i) to reduce the vulnerability of a country to financial 
crises, including capital flight during any currency crisis; (ii) to drive a wedge between onshore and offshore 
interest rates in order to provide monetary authorities with some policy autonomy at least in the short-run; (iii) 
to maintain some  short-term stability of nominal exchange rate and to reduce exchange rate pressures derived 
from excessive capital inflows. For this purpose capital controls can be used to change the composition and 
maturity structure of flows (towards longer maturity flows) and to enhance monetary authorities’ ability to act 
in the exchange foreign market. 
Although the effectiveness of capital controls are very controversial
5, evidence suggests that the 
macroeconomic benefits of capital management techniques can outweigh the microeconomic costs as show 
some recent experiences.  Magud and Reihart (2006) review more than 30 papers that evaluated  capital 
controls either on inflows or outflows around the world (the evaluation excludes countries with 
comprehensive capital controls, such as China and India), making use of a capital controls effectiveness index 
in order to standardize the results of the empirical studies. They conclude that “capital controls on inflows 
seem to make monetary policy more independent; alter the composition of capital flow; reduce real exchange 
rate pressures (although the evidence is more controversial)”, but “seem not to reduce the volume of net flows 
(and hence, the current account balance)” (Magud and Reihart, 2006, p.26), while “limiting private external 
borrowing in the ‘good times’ plays an important prudential role because more often than not countries that 
are ‘debt intolerant’” (Magud and Reihart, 2006, p.26-7). In the same connection Ho and McCauley (2003, 
p.34) concludes that “recent experience has shown that capital controls, if properly designed and applied, can 
be helpful in protecting the economy against the desestabilising aspects of capital flows, supporting the 
implementation of other policies and even resolving certain types of policy dilemma”. 
 
3. Exchange rate regimes, capital account convertibility and economic performance: the recent 
experience of BRICs countries 
3.1. Brazil 
 
Since beginning of the 1980s, Brazilian economy has had a low and volatile growth: between 1981 
and 2006, the average GDP growth was 2.2%, contrasting with economic growth of 7.1% in 1947-1980, that 
was during the period of import substitution industrialisation (ISI). Low economic growth (2.1% in 1990-
2006) has been the result of high inflation (until June 1994), the external vulnerability caused by the financing 
needs of balance of payments (at least until 2002) and also by the effects of the very high real interest rates 
(around 11% in 1999-2006 on average). As a result, investment rate has been low and stable for years (Table 
1). On the other hand, after three decades of high inflation, the combination of desindexation of the economy, 
huge reduction of import taxes, high interest rates and exchange rates appreciation, under the auspicious of the 
Real Plan, launched in July 1994, resulted in the sharp decrease of inflation: in 1995, consumer price index 
fell to 22.4%, and in 1998 reached 1.7%. Indeed, since beginning of the 1990s, Brazil has followed a pattern 
of economic development, which in broader terms was inspired by Washington Consensus, that includes a set 
of liberalising and market friendly policies such as privatization, trade liberalisation, stimulus to foreign direct 
investment (FDI), financial liberalisation, social security reform, and price stabilisation.
 
 
                                                 
5 Criticism on capital controls are partially related to the possible benefits of capital account liberalisation, that are: increased 
opportunities for risk diversification, a higher efficiency of global allocation of savings, and external discipline on domestic 
macroeconomic policies (Fisher, 1998). However, empirical evidence of capital account liberalisation upon economic 
performance is ambiguous while their links with financial crises are quite evident. Economists of IMF (Prasad et al, 2003, p.3) 
resume the empirical findings of the literature: “a systematic examination of the evidence suggests that is difficult to establish a 
robust causal relationship between the degree of financial integration and output growth performance”. 
  4Table 1. Brazil - basic economic indicators
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
GDP real growth (% p.a.) -4.4 1.0         -0.5 4.7 5.3 4.4 2.2 3.4 0 0.3 4.3 1.3 2.7 1.2 5.7 2.9
Gross fixed capital formation(%GDP) 17.3 18.3 18.4 19.3 20.7 20.5 19.3 19.9 19.7 18.9 19.3 19.5 18.3 17.8 19.6 19.9
Consumer price index (% p.a.) 1621.0 472.7 1119.1 2477.1 916.5 22.4 9.6 5.2 1.7 8.9 6.0 7.7 12.5 9.3 7.6 5.7
Fiscal balance (%of GDP) ... 26.5 44.3 59.6 24.7 6.6 5.3 5.5 7.0 5.3 3.4 3.3 4.2 4.7 2.4 3.0
Public debt (% of GDP) 42.01 34.14 37.06 32.56 30.01 27.98 30.72 31.83 38.94 44.53 45.54 48.44 50.46 52.36 46.99 46.45
Exchange rate average (real/USD) 0.0000 0.0001 0.0016 0.0322 0.6393 0.9177 1.0051 1.0780 1.1605 1.8147 1.8301 2.3577 2.9208 3.0771 2.9251 2.4344
Intern.reserves(excl.gold,USD million  7441 8033 22521 30604 37070 49708 58323 50827 42580 34796 32488 35739 37684 49111 52740 53574
Current account (% of GDP) -0.8 -0.4 1.6 -0.2 -0.3 -2.4 -2.8 -3.5 -4.0 -4.3 -3.8 -4.2 -1.5 0.75 1.6 1.2
International reserves(% of imports) 36.0 38.2 109.6 121.2 112.1 99.5 109.3 85.1 73.7 70.6 58.2 64.3 79.8 101.7 84.0 72.8
External debt (% of GDP) 26.3 30.5 35.1 33.9 27.3 20.1 21.4 23.0 28.6 41.1 36.6 37.9 41.8 38.8 30.3 19.2
External debt/exports ratio 3.9 3.9 3.8 3.8 3.4 3.4 3.8 3.8 4.7 5.0 4.3 3.6 3.5 2.9 2.1 1.4
Income debt (% of exports) 40.6 33.4 25.5 30.2 25.9 31.3 36.7 40.9 48.0 47.4 39.0 39.5 35.6 30.0 24.6 24.6
Trade balance (USD million) 10747 10578 15239 14329 10861 -3157 -5453 -6652 -6603 -1261 -698 2650 13121 24794 33666 44757
Current account (USD million) -3823 -1450 6089 20 -1153 -18136 -23248 -30491 -33829 -25400 -24225 -23215 -7636.6 4177.29 11737.6 14198.9
Source: IMF - International Financial Statistics; IPEADATA (GDP growth, CPI, fiscal balance and public debt)  
 
Since the beginning of the 1990s until nowadays, Brazil implemented different strategies of economic 
policy: in 1990-1994 period economic policy was based in a crawling peg exchange rate regime with nominal 
diary devaluations, that resulted in a depreciated real exchange rate
6, and a policy of high real interest rates; 
such policy generated both high trade balance surplus and the attraction of capital flows, at the costs of a very 
high inflation (Table 1). The period from July 1994 until January 1999, period of the Real Plan, is 
characterised by the use of a nominal anchor (a crawling exchange rate band) for stabilisation purposes and 
the implementation of a very tight monetary policy, that resulted in a huge exchange rate overvaluation, and 
the consequent increase of both trade deficits and capital inflows. This period is also marked by the contagious 
of external crises, such as Mexican crisis, Asian crisis and Russian crisis. Under the context of the semi-
pegged exchange rate, Central Bank of Brazil (BCB) reacted to the capital flight increasing sharply interest 
rates in order to seek reverting capital outflows (Figure 4).  
 
































Source: Central Bank of Brazil













































































































































































Source: Central Bank of Brazil
 
 
After the Brazilian currency crisis in January 1999, Brazil adopted a new economic policy based on 
the following guides: floating exchange rate regime, inflation targeting regime and the generation of primary 
fiscal surpluses
7, that has resulted in interest rates lower than the former period (1995-1998) but still high, and 
volatile exchange rates. In general inflation rate has been higher than the former period while since 2002 there 
is a remarkable improvement in the external sector balance due to the increase of the trade balance surplus 
favoured initially by the exchange rate devaluation and later by the increase in both demand and prices of the 
commodities in the international trade. The modus operandi of inflation targeting regime plus the a floating 
exchange rate regime, under the conditions of operation of (almost) full opening of the capital account, has 
                                                 
6 Real effective exchange rate index (REER) is defined as a nominal effective rate index  (index of the period average 
exchange rate of the currency in question to a weighted average of exchange rates for the currencies of selected countries) 
adjusted for relative movements in national price of home country and selected countries.  It should be stressed that REER in 
Brazil and other Latin American countries is calculated differently from the most conventional way, that is REER is calculated 
by multiplying the nominal exchange rate by the inflation rate of home country and dividing by that of a partner country, while 
most frequently (as in case of China, India and Russia in this paper) REER calculated by multiplying the nominal exchange 
rate by the inflation rate of a partner country and dividing by that of home country. As a result in the case of Brazil when REER 
increases this means undervaluation and when it declines means overvaluation. 
7 Fiscal primary surplus rose from 0.0% of GDP in 1998 to 3.2% in 2002, reaching 4.4 in 2003 and almost 5.0% in 2005. 
  5resulted in a sharp instability of the nominal exchange rate (Figure 2). Capital flight induced an exchange rate 
devaluation that affected domestic prices, which frequently jeopardized the BCB’s inflation target – the targets 
were missed in 2001-2003
8. Under these conditions, BCB has been compelled to increase the interest rate in 
order to seek to reduce the ‘pass through effect’ – as it was the case in 2001 in view of the turbulence of 
international markets and again in 2002-03 due to the confidence crisis related to the election of the leftist 
Lula da Silva as President. The BCB’s reaction to exchange rate movements has caused frequently a decline in 
output and employment, increasing at the same time the volume of public debt (Table 1). More recently, 
favoured by the benign international environment, BCB has gradually reduced short-term interest rate. 
Capital flows legislation in Brazil was introduced in the 1960s, according to which foreign capital 
flows should be registered in order to obtain permission for associated outflows (profits, interests, royalties, 
and repatriation). Since the end of the 1980s it can be noted an increasing trend towards capital account 
liberalisation in Brazil. Early 1990s foreign direct investment (FDI) was further liberalised as prohibition on 
FDI into certain sectors was lifted and bureaucratic obstacles were reduced. In 1991 Brazilian government 
permitted the acquisition by foreign institutional investors of equities of domestic firms. In 1992 BCB allowed 
a broad liberalisation of capital outflows as it permitted that a special non-resident account called CC5 could 
be operated more freely by foreign financial institutions as a result of acquisition or sale of foreign currencies. 
This exception created a privileged way to short-term capital flight that was used very often during periods of 
speculation attacks on domestic currency and represented the introduction of de facto convertibility, as in 
practice residents could deposit in a non-resident bank’s account held in a domestic bank, that could convert 
domestic into foreign currency: residents could transfer resources abroad making these deposits and asking the 
non-resident financial institution to buy foreign currency to make deposit in an account abroad
9. In April 1994 
Brady Plan converted the external loans into debt securities, helping to overcome the external debt crisis that 
had contributed somehow to the ‘stagflation’ environment of Brazil since 1981. In 1994 BCB implemented a 
financial transaction tax
10 and increased the minimum maturity requirements for capital inflows in order to 
reduce upward pressure on the exchange rate, to minimise the cost of sterilisation and to give some freedom 
degree for monetary policy.
11 At the same time, measures aimed to stimulate outflows – including the 
permission for prepayment of foreign borrowing and import finance – were also adopted.
   
 





































































































































































Source: Central Bank of Brazil
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Source: IMF  
After the 1999 Brazilian currency crisis and the adoption of a floating exchange regime, economic 
authorities implemented a lot of norms that resulted in further financial liberalisation (mainly related to capital 
outflows) and greater flexibility in foreign exchange market, including the unification of the exchange rate 
markets (floating and free ones), the reduction and later elimination of both the minimum average maturity for 
external loans and the financial transaction tax on capital inflows, the elimination of the restrictions on 
investments in the securities markets by foreign investors, and the simplification of the procedures related to 
the capital remittance to other countries
12.  In November 1999, Brazil accepted the obligations under Article 
                                                 
8 Inflation targets were 4.0% in 2001, 3.5% in 2002, and 3.5% in 2003 (later it was changed to maximum limit of 8.5%), with 
tolerance intervals of ± 2%; the consumer price index(IPCA) was 7.7%, 12;5% and 9.3%, respectively in 2001, 2002 and 2003.  
9 Goldfajn and Minella (2005) report the norms on capital controls in Brazil. 
10 The financial transaction tax was from 5% to 9% to Foreign Funds on Securities in October 1994. 
11 According Ariyoshi et al (2000) these capital controls were not effective in Brazil as capitals inflows increased a great deal 
and sophistication of financial system enable participants to circumvent most controls.   
12 In March 2005, Central Bank of Brazil authorized individuals and corporates to make transfer of resources abroad through 
their own bank accounts, a simplification in the norms that meant the end of CC-5 account. 
  6VIII of the IMF, that precludes the country members from imposing restrictions on the meaning of payments 
and transfers for current international transactions. More recently, in August 2006, Brazilian government 
introduced more flexibility on the exports operations’ exchange rate coverage as now it is allowed that 
Brazilian exporters can maintain abroad the maximum of 30% of their exports incomes. 
There are some controversies related to the macroeconomic effects of financial liberalisation in Brazil. 
Goldfajn and Minella (2005), for instance, support that, in order to reap the benefits of capital account 
liberalisation, such liberalisation should be accompanied by a broad range of reforms to improve and foster 
stronger institutions – such as approval of de jure central bank independence. However, the empirical findings 
suggest that financial liberalisation in Brazil resulted in greater exchange rate volatility and higher domestic 
interest rate – probably as consequence of the reduction of barriers to capital outflows. Ono et al (2005), using 
a VAR model with the objective to evaluate  the relation between capital controls, exchange rate and interest 
rate in Brazil during 1990-2001, found the following results: (i) the relation between short-term interest rate 
(Selic) and capital controls is negative, so that an increase (decrease) the former should result in the reduction 
(increase) in the interest rate; (ii) nominal exchange rate does not respond to the variations in the capital 
controls, what suggests that there is no evidence that capital controls generate an increase the exchange rate 
volatility, a hypothesis suggested by some Brazilian economists (Arida, 2004).  
 



















































































As we have seen, during the period of semi-pegged exchange rate regime BCB defined the nominal 
exchange rate inside a narrow band; after the 1999 devaluation of the real (Brazilian currency), however, BCB 
has had no commitment to determine exchange rate (both nominal and real), although it has operated 
occasionally in the exchange foreign markets in periods of greater capital flows volatility and more recently 
according to its policy to accumulate exchange reserves
13. Therefore, Brazilian exchange rate regime is not a 
freely floating exchange regime, as BCB eventually intervenes in foreign exchange market, but it is closer to a 
floating exchange regime than other emerging countries. Since end of 2002 real exchange rate has had an 
overvaluated trend due to both increase of trade surplus and capital flows. The latter has been attracted by high 
yield differentials between domestic and foreign bonds. As can be seen in Figure 6, the resumption of capital 
flows was dominated by portfolio investment (equity and debt securities) until 1997, while the decline in the 
capital flows was commanded by portfolio investments and other investments
14. Portfolio investments have 
played a crucial role in the large capital flow swings associated with the financial crisis. Since 1998 FDI has 
prevailed as the main source of capital flows. According to ECLAC (2000, p.35-6), Brazil was since 1996 the 
second-largest destination for FDI among developing countries, although the volume of FDI has declined 
more recently. 
                                                 
13 Souza and Hoff (2006), using Calvo-Reihart’s fear of floating indicators, show that from January 1999 to December 2005 
the frequency that monthly variation of exchange rate exceeded the band of ± 2.5% was 52% in Brazil, compared to 27% in 
other emerging countries of Latin America, and to 19% in Asian emerging countries. 
14 ‘Other investments include short-and long term trade credits, loans, currency and deposits (transferable and other), etc. 
  7External vulnerability was a marked feature in Brazil since mid-1990s due mainly the dependence of 
foreign capital in order to reach some equilibrium in the balance of payments and also a result of the gradual 
but increasing opening up of capital account. Indeed, the ratio external indebtedness to exports, a traditional 
indicator of external solvency, was up to 3.0 until 2002. Due to the current account deficits, that reached more 
than 4% in 1998, Brazilian economy was very dependent of foreign capitals by the end of the 1990s, what left 
the economy very vulnerable to external contagious (Paula and Alves Jr, 2000). Even after the adoption of a 
floating exchange regime, in 1999, Brazilian economy suffered strong speculative pressures in 2001 and 2002, 
when there was eventually a situation of ‘sudden stop’ of capitals, derived by the lost of confidence of 
investors caused by the likely election of Lula’s candidate. The growth of exports since 2002 and the quick 
reduction of external indebtedness have resulted in an improvement of the indicators of external vulnerability: 
the ratio foreign debt over exports declined from 2.5% in 2002 to 1.4% in 2005.  At the same time, foreign 
reserves have increased due to the foreign reserve accumulation policy that has been implemented by BCB. 
However, sterilisation operations have been costly to Brazilian government, due to the high interest rate 
differential between domestic and international bonds - public debt has been more or less in the same level 
despite of the fiscal primary surplus. 
 
3.2  Russia 
Russia, from 1990 to 2006, had on average a negative economic growth of minus 0.1%. However, if 
we divide the Russian economy growth  in two periods, that is before and after the 1998 Russian crisis, we 
have quite different periods: while from 1990 until 1998 GDP real growth accumulated a fall of around 45%, 
the average GDP growth from 1999 until 2006 - 6.7% - did performed well.  Figure 1 and Table 2 present the 
behaviour of GDP growth in Russia in 1990-2006 period.  After the 1998 Russian financial crisis the rebound 
of the economy has been faster and stronger than anyone could predicted. Indeed, recent Russian economic 
performance corresponds closely to the notion of a ‘growth acceleration’, as defined by Hausmann et al 
(2004), that is at least eight years of sustainable economic growth.  
 
Table 2. Russia - basic economic indicators
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
GDP real growth (% p.a.) -8.7 -12.7 -4.1 -3.6 1.4 -5.3 6.4 10.0 5.1 4.7 7.3 7.2 6.4
Gross fixed capital formation(%GDP) 20.4 21.8 21.1 20.0 18.3 16.1 14.4 16.9 18.9 17.9 18.4 18.3 18.2
Consumer price index (% p.a.) 874.6 304.6 197.5 47.7 14.8 27.7 85.7 20.8 21.5 15.8 13.7 10.9 12.7
Fiscal balance (%of GDP) ... ... 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1
Public debt (% of GDP) 65.1 45.7 40.7 32.8 55 79.4 88.8 56.8 42.9 36.6 31.9 24.5 16.6
Oil price, brent blend (USD/bbl) 17.1 15.96 17 20.6 19.2 12.8 17.8 28.4 24.4 24.9 28.8 38.2 54.4
Exchange rate average (ruble/USD) 1.0 2.2 4.6 5.2 5.8 9.7 24.6 28.1 29.2 31.3 30.7 28.8 28.3
Intern.reserves(excl.gold,USD million) 5835 3980 14383 11276 12895 7801 8457 24264 32542 44054 73175 120809 175891
Current account (% of GDP) 4.6 2.3 3.0 0.0 0.2 13.8 18.1 11.4 8.5 7.9 9.6 11.1
International reserves (% of imports) 24.7 11.7 20.5 22.6 19.2 28.6 56.9 61.9 71.3 92.0 116.3 132.4
External debt (% of GDP) ... ... 39.3 34.6 31.4 115.4 ... ... ... 33.8 24.0 ... 10.2
External debt/exports ratio ... ... 1.5 1.4 1.4 2.0 ... ... ... 1.1 0.8 ... 0.3
Income debt (% of exports) ... 7.9 9.2 10.8 14.7 21.5 15.3 10.9 10.8 11.4 17.8 13.7 15.2
Trade balance (USD million) ... 16928 19816 21591 14913 16429 36014 60172 48121 46335 59860 85825 118266
Current account (USD million) ... 7844 6965 10847 -80 219 24616 46839 33935 29116 35410 58592 83184
Source: IMF - International Financial Statistics; Deutsche Bank Research (GDP, oil price and public debt).  
 
According to Berengaut and Elborgh-Woytek (2005) this so different performance can be explained 
by the fact that during 1990-1998 period the main reason to why Russian economy presented so poor 
performance is related to the transition from a planning and centralized economy to a market economy. 
Russian economy after 1990 experimented a rapid process of economic change, that was not succeed, that 
included privatization of state-owner firms with no clear rules and no property rights, abrupt price 
liberalisation, and a quick process of trade liberalisation and  financial liberalisation. The collapse of the old 
system and the slow adjustment to a new one imposed heavy social costs in terms of unemployment, living 
standards and distribution of income
15. The priority of economic policy that time was to bring down a 
continuing high rate of inflation, which was still, in 1994, over 300%. For this purpose government decided to 
use exchange rate as a ‘nominal anchor’ for monetary policy: exchange rate was kept pledged within a 
preannounced corridor, with a depreciation well bellow the inflation rate, what resulted in real exchange rate 
                                                 
15 Unemployment rate increased quickly to more than 10% in 1997. 
  8appreciation (Figure 7 and 8). Russian government started a gradual liberalisation of restrictions on non-
resident portfolio investment in 1994 that was completed in early 1998.
16  The weak performance of trade 
combined with a tight monetary policy, under a context of disordered transition to capitalism, contributed to 
the very bad economic performance in 1990-1998 period. 
According to Owen and Robinson (2003, p.25-26), the seeds of the 1998 Russian financial crisis were 
related to some economic unbalances: a large budget deficit (7.4% of GDP in 1996) arising from the 
government inability to collect taxes and contain expenditure; a large short-term domestic debt; the lack of 
structural reform in banking, natural monopoly, and agricultural sectors. Furthermore, the Asian crisis by 
contributing to weakening commodity prices (especially oil) sparked a sharp deterioration in Russia’s terms of 
trade – what resulted in a sudden decline in the trade balance from US$ 21.6 billion in 1996 to US$ 14.9 
billion in 1997; the contagious of the Asian crisis substantially increased the cost of access and reduced the 
volume of foreign capitals (Owen and Robinson, 2003, p.5). Under such environment, Russian authorities got 
a financing package with IMF, the World Bank and Japan, and announced emergency measures in August 
1998 – that included a default on rubble-denominated government debt maturing before end-1999, an 
adjustment to the exchange rate band from 5.3-7.1 rubbles before end-1999 and the reintensification of capital 
controls – in an attempt to quell the pressure on reserves. However, negative market reaction, reflecting the 
fragile remained fiscal situation, forced rubble to fall quickly to the edge of the new exchange band and the 
band was abandoned on September 2, leaving the exchange rate to float. Losses in international reserves were 
by US$ 5.1 billion in 1998 and consumer prices rose very sharply, with inflation reaching 86% p.a. in 1999. 
 
Figure 7. Russia - official exchange rate 





























Figure 8. Russia - NBER and REER 
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Source: IMF/International Financial Statistics 
 
The initial output collapse that followed the August 1998 crisis in Russia was not as deep as in most 
other crisis countries and recovery was quicker and stronger than other crisis countries due to a set factors that 
include: (i) import substitution stimulated by large exchange rate depreciation; (ii) the fact that channels 
through shocks are generally transmitted to the real economy in crisis situations were less relevant in the case 
of Russia than in other emerging market economies, as private sector wealth was largely held outside the 
banking sector, and relatively few enterprises had significant foreign currency liabilities not matched by 
foreign currency income streams; and (iii) the positive terms of trade change from rising oil prices gave a 
further boost to the economy from mid-1999, and allowed a quick recovery of international reserves (Owen 
and Robinson, 2003, p.7-9). Furthermore, Central Bank of Russia (CBR) acted quickly to address the 
problems in the banking sector, improving rapidly liquidity situation of the banks, what avoided general run 
on deposits and at the same time enhanced the payments system.  
As we have already stressed, growth performance after the Russian crisis has been strong contrasting 
with the pre-crisis period.  By 2000 high oil prices - the average oil price increased from US$ 12,8 in 1998 to 
US$ 28,4 in 2000 - contributed to a quick rise in investment rate of the economy (Table 2). Furthermore, the 
rise of aggregate demand also contributed to boost economic growth, favoured by the increase in both 
pensions and wages, the increase of net exports, and the decline of interest rates due to the adoption of a more 
expansionary monetary policy (Figure 9), that has stimulated the increase of banking credit, from 12% of GDP 
in 1999 to 22% in 2003 (IMF, 2004, p.10). Energy sector has direct impact on output growth, as it contributes 
                                                 
16 Non-residents were allowed to open special rubble-denominated bank accounts with which to buy government securities in 
either the primary or secondary markets. See more in Ariyoshi et al (2000, Ch 2). 
  9about 20% of GDP, and indirectly as it pushes other industrial sector (such as construction and machinery). 
However, the economic recovery was broad-based as large real exchange rate depreciation in late 1998 
provided a strong boost to the competitiveness of the tradable sector which was translated into a surge in the 
output in many sectors of the economy (Owen and Robinson, 2003, p.51). 
Pushed by the increase of the oil prices (US$ 54.4 in 2005), trade balance increased from US$ 16.4 
billion in 1998 to US$ 36.0 billion in 1999, rising steadily until to reach US$ 118.3 billion in 2005, despite of 
the recent deterioration of non-fuel trade balance; as a result, the ratio current account over GDP increased 
from 0.2% in 1998 to 11.1% in 2005. Foreign reserves were until 1999 relatively low to satisfy the needs of 
imports of goods by the Russian economy, as they covered on average only 20% of the Russian imports. 
However, since 2002 the ratio international reserves over imports have been around 88% on average. The 
continuous and sharp increase of foreign reserves, from US$ 8.5 billion in 1999 to US$ 175.0 billion in 2005, 
is due to an aggressive foreign reserves accumulation policy under a context of high current account surplus 
and capital flows reversal after 2002. Indeed, all the external vulnerability indicators have had a very clear 
improvement since 1999, as can be seen in Table 2. In particular, the external debt-to-exports ratio declined 
from 2.0 in 1998 to only 0.3 in 2005. After many years of massive capital outflows, capital flows have 
changed course in 2002, with significant reduction in capital outflows and a surge in capital inflows, including 
higher borrowing (Figure 9).  The combination of a prolonged period of high world energy prices with some 
capital account surplus has generated a real exchange rate trend, that has gradually returned to its pre-crisis 
level, despite of the efforts of CBR to attenuate this trend (Figure 8).  As nominal exchange rate has been 
stable, due to the active performance of CBR in the foreign exchange market, the bulk of real appreciation 
took the form of a persistently high inflation differential. The continued rapid real appreciation has raised the 
risk of ‘Dutch disease’ that can reduce the efforts of diversification of the Russia’s production and export 
structure – a current concern of the Russian government. 
 


















Russia have adopted after the 1998 crisis an administered floating exchange regime, under a context of 
capital account partially convertibility. CBR has pursued multiple objectives, avoiding an unnecessarily tight 
monetary policy for fear of slowing output growth. The main goal of the CBR has been to accumulate reserves 
and to prevent overly rapid real exchange rate appreciation, by maintaining nominal effective exchange rate 
stable, in an effort to preserve the competitiveness of manufacturing sector, and also to smooth the path of 
exchange-rate adjustment, while guiding down inflation has been an important, but secondary, objective.
17 
Inflation, though still high, has continued to edge downwards each year despite relatively lax monetary 
conditions (Figure 10 and 11). Russian government makes use of some sort of capital controls on inflows and 
outflows, although more recently it has liberalized again some foreign exchange transactions. Controls on 
capital outflows include the requirement permission from the CBR to portfolio investment abroad and the 
need that Russian credit institutions have to create reserve for operations with offshore residents (Mohanty and 
                                                 
17 Several econometric studies conclude that monetary policy has tended to focus on an implicit exchange rate target since the 
late 1990s. See, among others, Esanov et al (2005). 
  10Scatigna, 2005, p.52). In 2004 CBR implemented requirement reserves on capital inflows, with a moderate 
use, justified by the needs to protect the still weak banking sector from the more volatile capital flows. Other 
restrictions on capital inflows include the requirement of permission to CBR to raise capital abroad.  
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Source: IMF/International Financial Statistics 
 
Large-scale foreign exchange purchases by CBR – via unsterilised interventions - have been combined 
with large fiscal surplus. According to Owen and Robinson (2002, p.12), fiscal restraint in the face of 
burgeoning oil revenues allowed the government to quickly rebuild international reserves while slowing the 
real appreciation of the rubble. Since 1999 fiscal position strengthened due to a remarkable fiscal adjustment 
of 9.5% of GDP from 1997 to 2001, that resulted from both higher oil revenues and a reduction of real 
government expenditures. While in 2002 and 2003 fiscal surplus has declined compared to the previous 
period, it increased sharply  in 2004 and 2005 (4.9% and 7.5% of GDP, respectively), due to the extra fiscal 
revenue arising from higher oil prices since 2002.  
The Oil Stabilisation Fund
18, established in 2004, in which the bulk of the windfall fiscal revenue is 
accumulated, plays a crucial role in maintaining the fiscal surplus. In 2005, around two-thirds of the increase 
in revenues from oil, gas and oil product exports was actually sterilized through the Stabilisation Fund. Some 
flexibility in the fiscal policy was introduced in 2006 with the creation of an Investment Fund in the federal 
budget. The aim of the fund is to finance infrastructure investment and innovation related projects in joint 
public-private partnerships (PPPs).  The sums involved have been relatively small – around 0.26% of 
projected GDP for 2006 and 0.34% in 2007. 
 
3.3. India 
India, after years of low economic growth and after facing a financial crisis in 1991, has had a 
dramatic change in economic growth: the real GDP growth was on average 6.5% in 1990-2006 (Figure 1 and 
Table 3), while it was 3.1% in 1971-1980 and 4.7% in 1981-1990 (Ariff and Khalid, 2005, p.97). Although 
India still has an enormous lack of infra-structure, investment rate has increased from around 22% in the first 
half of the 1990s to around 24% during the 2000s. This good economic performance has been the result, 
among other factors, of the enormous potential of its domestic consumer market, the existence of a segment of 
well-qualified workers, the strong productivity growth (more than 3.5% over the course of the 1990s), the 
management of a well-coordinated economic policy, and the implementation of economic reforms. Capital 
account liberalisation has been part of a broad-based programme of economic reform, that included the 
abolishment of industrial license, the sharp reduction in the import taxes, liberalisation of the transactions 
related to the current account and a more limited liberalisation of the capital flows related to the capital 
account. 
 
                                                 
18 The Oil Stabilisation Fund (OIF) was created in 2004 with the objective of reducing the impact of fluctuations of oil prices 
on the resources available to the budget. ‘Surplus’ revenues resulting from relatively high oil prices are accumulated in the 
Fund automatically: 95% of the income from the natural resource extraction tax and 100% of the crude oil export duty above 
that which would accrue at on oil price of $27/bbl (Urals) is automatically transferred to the Fund. Until the Fund accumulates 
a total of RUB 500 billion, Stabilisation Fund may be spend only to finance the federal deficit arising as a result of oil prices 
below the cut-off price of $27 for Urals crude(OECD, 2006,Ch 2). 
  11Table 3. India - basic economic indicators
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
GDP real growth (% p.a.) 5.8 0.9 5.3 4.9 7.6 7.5 7.4 4.5 6.0 7.1 3.9 5.2 4.6 8.3 7.3 9.0
Gross fixed capital formation(%GDP) 22.9 22.0 22.4 21.4 21.9 24.4 22.8 21.7 21.5 23.3 22.7 23.1 24.1 24.7 25.9 ...
Consumer price index (% p.a.) 9.0 13.9 11.8 6.4 10.2 10.2 9.0 7.2 13.2 4.7 4.0 3.7 4.4 3.8 3.8 4.2
Fiscal balance (%of GDP) -7.6 -5.5 -5.3 -7.0 -5.6 -5.0 -4.9 -4.9 -5.3 -5.4 -5.2 -4.7 -5.9 -4.5 -4.0 -4.1
Public debt (% of GDP) ... ... 84.5 83.9 77.9 71.4 67.8 68.3 69.5 69.9 71.1 82.7 85.5 82.1 86.0 83.1
Exchange rate average (ruppe/USD) 17.5 22.7 25.9 30.5 31.4 32.4 35.4 36.3 41.3 43.1 44.9 47.2 48.6 46.6 45.3 44.1
Intern.reserves(excl.gold,USD million) 5504 6841 8961 13916 23366 22046 24212 27933 30216 35744 40793 48819 71049 103582 131830 136932
Current account (% of GDP) -2.2 -1.7 -1.6 -0.7 -0.5 -1.6 -1.6 -0.8 -1.7 -0.7 -1.0 0.3 1.4 1.1 ... ...
International reserves (% imports) 23.5 32.4 39.1 57.7 78.7 58.1 55.3 61.1 67.4 78.5 75.7 95.3 129.9 151.9 ... ...
External debt (% of GDP) 26.7 32.5 37.6 34.9 32.2 26.9 24.5 23.2 23.8 22.2 21.8 20.5 20.7 18.8 17.9 ...
External debt/exports ratio 3.2 2.7 2.3 2.6 2.8 3.4 3.7 4.0 4.0 4.3 4.4 4.7 4.6 5.1 5.2 ...
Income debt (% of exports) 20.6 23.9 21.8 19.1 17.5 17.0 14.1 14.3 16.3 15.8 17.5 17.7 14.1 14.0 ... ...
Long-term debt (% external debt) 86.6 87.7 87.6 90.8 91.6 92.1 91.4 93.9 95.3 96.0 96.5 97.0 96.1 95.4 93.5 ...
Trade balance (USD million) -5150.9 -2992 -2911.2 -2092.5 -4150.1 -6718.8 -10052 -10028 -10752 -8678.9 -10640 -6417.9 -3559.3 -8870.2 ... ...
Current account (USD million) -7037 -4292 -4485 -1876 -1676 -5563 -5956 -2965 -6903 -3228 -4601 1410 7060 6853 ... ...
Source: IMF - International Financial Statistics; ADB (fiscal balance in 2002-2005; external debt).  
 
Economic liberalisation accelerated after the external debt crisis of 1991,  when rupee, the domestic 
currency, was depreciated in two steps by almost 20% vis-à-vis the US dollar (see Figure 12); liberalisation 
began with a dramatic process of trade liberalisation; as a result, the imports tariffs reduced from 87.0% on 
average in 1991 to 25.0% on average in 1997 (IMF, 2001, p.32). Under the context of economic reform, 
capital account has been gradually liberalised and the exchange rate regime changed from a pegged exchange 
rate to a managed floating exchange regime. This change began with the transition of a managed floating 
related to basket of currencies to a dual exchange rate regime in March 1992. Finally, India adopted a floating 
and unified exchange rate regime in March 1993. The change in the exchange rate regime was followed step-
by-step by flexibility on current account transactions, that resulted in the acceptance of full convertibility of 
current account in August 1994, that is the formal acceptance of the obligations of the IMF’s Article VII. 
Although India adopted formally a floating exchange regime, in practice it is a quasi-managed float where the 
Reserve Bank of India (RBI) plays a crucial role in the foreign exchange market. Indeed, RBI has been an 
important player in the foreign exchange market, acting to avoid that some big transactions in this market can 
increase the exchange rate volatility, and at the same time seeking to affect the real effective exchange rate 
trajectory in the long run. For this purpose, RBI makes use of a very large range of tools operating in the spot 
and derivative markets, and even making use of administered measures. Such management has been possible 
due to the existence of extensive capital controls that result in a limited integration into international financial 
markets.  
Compared to other countries that adopted floating exchange regime, the volatility of nominal exchange 
rate has been lower in India (IMF, 2001, p.152). Exchange rate has been used in India, combined with other 
extra-exchange rate tools, to absorb external shocks. As a general trend, nominal exchange rate has been 
gradually devaluated since 1996 (Figure 12 and 13). Real effective exchange rate has been most time stable, 
while recently there is a gradual appreciation trend. Indeed, during the 1990s RBI followed a PPP rule 
whereby the nominal exchange rate was indexed to the price level to target the real exchange rate (Kohli, 
2005, p.153). Since the end of the 1990s, exchange rate policy has begun to change a little the course, shifting 
from stabilizing the exchange rate towards a more flexible rate regime with no fixed target, but still concerned 
in curbing excessive volatility and calibrating temporary mismatches in the demand and supply of foreign 
exchange.  






























Figure 13 India - REER and NEER 
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As we have already stressed, after 1991 external debt crisis, India began a gradual but rapid process of 
liberalisation of current account, that included the end of the foreign exchange budget and the elimination of 
controls on current transactions. Although some norms related to long term capital flows have been loosened, 
including the limits of ownership share related to foreign direct investment, short term capital controls are still 
significant.  The approach to capital account liberalisation in India has been cautious: what was liberalised has 
been specified while everything else remained restricted or prohibited. The contours of liberalisation were in 
large part shaped by the lessons of the 1991 external debt crisis – mainly problems related to roll over short-
term debt and capital flight due to deposits withdrawals by non-resident Indian.  
The Indian approach of gradual and limited liberalisation of capital account has emphasized opening 
up of the economy to foreign direct investment and portfolio equity investment, instead of external debt, with 
the objective to reduce the country’s vulnerability to external crises by reducing reliance on volatile short-term 
debt flows that characterized the 1980s (Habermeier, 2000, p.80). First, concerning capital inflows, financial 
liberalisation began with a more flexible policy related to foreign direct investment (FDI) in July 1991 when 
FDI with up to 51% equity was to receive automatic approval in 35 selected high priority industries subject 
only to a registration procedure with the RBI, while access through the automatic route has been progressively 
enlarged over time. Second, liberalisation was extended to portfolio investment in September 1992, when 
foreign institutional investors were allowed to invest in the domestic capital market, first in the secondary 
market for equity subject a ceiling of 5% and later in the primary market (maximum limit of 15% of the new 
issue). Third, liberalisation in the sphere of external commercial borrowings (ECBs) has been limited, 
selective and variable. Commercial borrowings require case by case approval from the government where the 
decision depends upon the amount borrowed, the maturity period and the proposed utilization. Deregulation of 
ECBs has been subject to annual ceilings decided on the basis of the country’s external debt and balance of 
payments position. Finally, concerning non-resident deposits, in order to avoid capital flight, Indian 
government reduced the interest rate differentials (typical of the 1980s), so that interest rates offered to these 
deposits were gradually aligned with international rates, and RBI has no longer underwritten the exchange rate 
risk (Nayyar, 2002). 
Capital controls in India have been well-designed and clearly effective in limiting measured capital 
flows. There has been a predominance of quantitative capital controls rather than market based, 
administratively enforced, and clearly demarcating the distinction between resident (with more strict controls) 
and non-resident transactions. On the other hand, there are more extensive controls on capital outflows and 
considerable liberalisation on capital inflows. In particular, capital outflows related to residents are more 
limited: while they are very restricted to individuals, for domestic firms capital outflows are possible within 
some limits stipulated by the government. More recently, restrictions on individuals and domestic corporates 
have been loosened to allow investments abroad.
19 Capital controls in India have also been dynamic, that is 
government tends to tight capital controls on outflows during speculative periods and to loose them after that 
(Epstein et al, 2003, p.30).  
Due mainly to the increase of foreign exchange reserves and the limits to accumulation of foreign debt 
(mostly short-term ones), most external vulnerability indicators show a remarkable and continuous 
improvement since 1991: the ratio current account over GDP has been below to -2.0%, and since 2001 the 
ratio has been positive, due mainly to the increase of services and income  and current transfers
20. Although 
the traditional external solvency indicator (external debt over exports) has gradually increased during the 
1990s, the external indebtedness declined markedly, from a peak of 38% of GDP in 1992 to less than 25% in 
1996, while the ratio income debt over exports declined sharply in the first-middle of the 1990s. Furthermore,  
since 1993 the share of the long-term debt on the total external debt has been more than 90% - a clear 
evidence that the reorientation of capital account policy toward non-debt creating inflows and FDI since 1991 
succeeded. Finally, the international reserves-to-imports ratio increased to more than 100% by 2002 compared 
to less than 40% in the beginning of the 1990s. Indeed international reserves rose from US$ 30.2 billion in 
1998 to US$ 136.9 billion in 2005 – an increase of 453% in just seven years – due to a more aggressive RBI’s 
exchange reserve accumulation policy (Table 3). Summing up, the improvement of external vulnerability 
                                                 
19 For instance, mutual funds in India are now permitted to invest up to US$ 1 billion abroad. 
20 Although India has managed to diversify its exports towards higher value added goods, the country’s export performance has 
lagged that of Asia of its share of global exports remains low (IMF, 2006, Ch II). 
  13indexes in India resulted mainly from the low current account deficit, a declining external debt and the 
increasing level of foreign reserves. 
 




























The nature and the pace of capital account liberalisation exercised an influence on the dimensions and 
the composition of the private foreign capital inflows to, and outflows from, India – a shift from debt creating 
to non-debt creating capital flows (Figure 14). Capital flows has raised a great deal along the 1990s,  followed 
by a sharp change in their composition: until 1993 there was a predominance of other investments  (that 
include,  among others item, non-resident Indian deposits – NRI and foreign loans) while other types of capital 
flows were almost non-existent; since 1994 capital flows have raised and diversified due the increase of 
portfolio investments, other investments and foreign direct investment. However, financial integration of the 
India economy into international capital markets has been still slow and limited: FDI has been increasing 
during 1990s, but it is low compared to other ‘big’ emerging countries; according to IMF (2005, p.20), the 
ratio FDI over GDP in 2002 was 3.7% in China, 3.1% in Brazil, 2.1% in Mexico and only 0.6% in India.  
Due to the adoption of a managed floating exchange regime, that has resulted in a stable nominal 
exchange rate, domestic interest rate has had a more unstable behaviour, probably because interest rate has 
been used as a tool to stabilize nominal exchange rate and also due to non-sterilized operations related to 
foreign exchange accumulation policy.  Figure 15 shows that there is a remarkable declining trend of interest 
rate in India after the adoption of the managed floating exchange rate regime in 1993 and the steady reduction 
of the cash reserves requirement since 1991. Such interest rate reduction has stimulated credit expansion under 
a market based credit system. It seems that in India capital controls have been used not only to reduce external 
vulnerability and to avoid currency crises, but also to drive a wedge between domestic and external interest 
rates in order to provide RBI discretion to achieve some monetary policy autonomy.  
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  14Finally, concerning the inflation, there is a general declining trend of the consumer prices index, for 
which the combination between trade liberalisation with (the more recent) exchange rate appreciation has 
contributed somehow. Fiscal deficit has been high (Table 3), that is higher than 4.0% of GDP (but declining 
more recently), and public debt has also been very high (more than 80% of the GDP); however, it is mostly 
domestic, denominated in rupee and with predominance of long-term debt (IMF, 2005a). Inflation increased in 
two moments, during the balance-of-payments crisis of 1991 and during 1997 Asian crisis (Figure 16). It 
should be stressed that inflation rate has been reduced while domestic interest rate has also declined.  
 
3.5. China 
The performance of Chinese economy has been impressive: the average real GDP growth was 9.8% 
from 1990 to 2006 (Figure 1 and Table 4), the same growth of 1980-1989 period, that means that for more 
than 25 years China is growing on average by 10% p.a.! Investment is the driving force of economic 
expansion: the investment rate has increased rapidly from 25% of GDP in 1990 to more than 30% after 1992 
and since 2004 more than 40%. Banking credit to business sector over GDP, under a bank-based system 
dominated by state-owned banks, has been almost double compared to OECD area (OECD, 2005, p.42). 
Finally, the high growth performance is partly due to rapid growth of the export sector. This growth has been 
followed step-by-step by a remarkable expansion of China in the international trade: the country’s share in 
world trade increased from 0.8% to 7.7% during 1988-2005 (Zhao, 2006, p.4). Economic aperture in Chinese 
experience has been gradual and incremental: reforms tend to be undertaken on an experimental basis in some 
localities or provinces before implementing programmes on a nationwide basis; reforms started in the late 
1970s, and in 1980 the first Special Economic Zones were created. From 1979 to 1986, China’s policy toward 
foreign direct investment (FDI) was characterised by the attitude that FDIs were welcome, but to be highly 
regulated; after 1986 China granted permission for the operation of wholly owned foreign enterprises 
(Haihong, 2000, p.19-20). Major changes in the functioning of the economy were introduced in the 1990s, 
such as encouragement of foreign investment, reduction of effective tariffs on imported inputs
21, the 
modernization of the public corporations, the abolition of multiple exchange rates, and the introduction of 
convertibility for current account transactions.   
 
 Table 4. China - basic economic indicators
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
GDP real growth (% p.a.) 3.8        9.2        14.2      13.9      13.1      10.9      10.0      9.3        7.8        7.6        8.4        8.3        9.1        10.0      10.1      10.2     
Gross fixed capital formation(%GDP) 25.0 26.8 30.9 36.0 34.5 33.0 32.4 31.8 33.0 33.6 34.3 34.6 36.3 39.2 40.6 41.9
Consumer price index (% p.a.) 3.1 3.5 6.3 14.6 24.2 16.9 8.3 2.8 -0.8 -1.4 0.3 0.5 -0.8 1.2 4.0 1.8
Fiscal balance (%of GDP) -3.7 -3.3 -2.6 -1.9 -1.9 -1.4 -1.2 -1.1 -1.5 -2.2 -2.8 -4.0 -2.6 -2.1 -1.3 -1.2
Public debt (% of GDP) ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 17.7 18.9 19.2 18.5 17.9
Exchange rate average (yuan/USD) 4.8 5.3 5.5 5.8 8.6 8.4 8.3 8.3 8.3 8.3 8.3 8.3 8.3 8.3 8.3 8.2
Intern.reserves(excl.gold,USD million) 29586 43674 20620 22387 52914 75377 107039 142762 149188 157728 168278 215605 291128 408151 614500 821514
Current account (% of GDP) 3.2 2.2 1.3 -1.8 1.2 0.2 0.8 3.7 3.0 1.9 1.7 1.3 2.4 2.8 3.5 7.0
International reserves (% of imports) 57.3 70.1 27.1 22.7 46.9 58.4 78.6 102.3 109.4 97.0 76.0 89.9 100.2 100.1 110.3 124.9
External debt (% of GDP) 14.9 14.5 15.1 13.5 16.9 15.5 14.4 14.9 13.8 13.8 12.2 9.0 12.8 12.7 12.0 ...
External debt/exports ratio 1.07 1.02 1.04 1.14 0.98 0.92 0.85 0.80 0.78 0.78 0.58 0.69 0.57 0.48 0.42 ...
Income debt (% of exports) 3.2 4.0 6.3 6.2 5.6 11.4 13.1 9.1 12.1 11.7 10.9 10.7 7.2 5.5 4.1 3.7
Long-term debt (% external debt) 82.3 82.1 81.0 82.2 82.6 81.1 80.3 78.6 88.0 90.0 91.0 69.5 64.6 57.7 52.8 ...
Trade balance (USD million) 9165 8743 5183 -10654 7290 18050 19535 46222 46614 35982 34474 34017 44167 44652 58982 134189
Current account (USD million) 11997 13272 6401 -11609 6908 1618 7243 36963 31472 21115 20518 17401 35422 45875 68659 160818
Source: IMF - International Financial Statistics; Deutsche Bank Research (public debt); ADB (external debt).  
 
Since the end of the 1970s, exchange rate regime has changed sometimes: firstly it was centralized and 
still a fixed one; from 1986 to 1993 the exchange rate was dual, where the official rate, that was subject to 
periodic adjustments, coexisted with the market-determined rate in the swap centres
22 - the second rate was set 
at a relatively depreciated level as compared to the official rate. In 1994, the official rate was devaluated and 
unified with the exchange rate at the swap centres, and a managed floating exchange regime was officially 
adopted. In practice, however, after short period of some appreciation of nominal exchange rate, the renminbi 
(RMB), the domestic currency, also known as yuan, was de facto fixed to the U.S. dollar since 1995 (Figure 
17). Central bank’s intervention to maintain a stable exchange rate has been large scale, with reserves rising to 
                                                 
21 Average import customs duty was reduced from 45% in 1992 to 17.5% in 2000 (Ariff and Khalid, 2005, p.88). 
22In swap centres, exporters, importers, and other parties with foreign exchange supply or needs could transact at a market-
determined exchange rate. By 1991, all residents were allowed to sell foreign exchange at the swap rate at the designed bank 
branches. In 1998 swap centres were closed and all exchange payments were bought into the banking settlement system. 
  15more than 30% of GDP by end 2004. In July 2005, the Chinese authorities announced a revaluation of the 
exchange rate against the dollar of 2.1%, with the currency able to move daily in a narrow range of ± 0.3%.
23 
In addition, the central rate for the RMB is determined by a basket of currencies the composition of which was 
not revealed. Again, in practice it has not resulted in greater changes in the modus operandi of Chinese 
exchange rate policy.  
 
Figure 18. China - NEER and REER 
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Source: IMF/International Financial Statistics 
 
Popular Bank of China, the central bank, acts as a market marker in the foreign exchange market.
24 
The management of a (semi) fixed exchange rate in China has been possible due to the existence of a 
widespread capital controls system on both inflows and outflows, mainly through the use of prohibitions and 
quantitative limits. The objectives of the controls evolved over time, but generally have included: (i) to help 
channel external savings to desired uses; (ii) keeping monetary policy independent of the influence of 
international developments, under a context of a managed exchange rate regime: (iii) preventing firms and 
financial institutions from taking excessive external risks : (iv) maintaining balance of payments equilibrium 
and keeping exchange rate stability; and (iv) to insulate the economy from foreign financial crises  (Zhao, 
2006, p.8). Indeed, China has followed a pattern of financial liberalisation in which sequence starts with 
liberalising the trade account, then relaxing foreign exchange restrictions, then the long term capital account, 
and finally the short term capital account  (Epstein et al, 2005, p.33-4).    
In 1996 China accepted the IMF Article VII, that resulted in the liberalisation of foreign exchange 
controls related to current account transactions. Furthermore, since then controls over inflows and outflows by 
non-residents have been loosened, while maintaining strict but porous controls on inflows and outflows by 
residents. In fact, at the end of 1996 there were a lot of controls on foreign exchange transactions: (i) non-
residents were forbidden to operate in the money market, stock market and derivative market; they could only 
buy some sort of shares; (ii) residents could only operate in these markets abroad with previous approval of 
the monetary authorities, while in some operations there were quantitative restrictions; (iii) prior approval was 
required for any foreign borrowing, foreign currency-denominated bond issues, and guarantees in foreign 
exchange (Haihong, 2000). Therefore, portfolio capitals were not welcome due to segregation between 
residents and non-residents in the stock markets, while restrictions on other types of external loans were 
pervasive and generally subject to strict ceilings – controls on foreign debt accumulation prevented the 
excessive accumulation of foreign debt by residents, controls on equity inflows prevented a speculative bubble 
in the stock market, while controls on outflows in general prevented devastating surges of capital flight.  
It should be stressed the dynamic nature of the controls in China, with the authorities tightening 
enforcement during crisis periods and then loosening them when the crisis subsides (Epstein et al, 2005, p.35). 
As can be seen in Table 4 and Figure 19, during 1997 Asian crisis, although current account remained in 
surplus and FDI remained strong, capital account deteriorated sharply. Under this circumstance, the authorities 
intensified enforcement of exchange and capital controls, and moved to reduce circumvention – including 
verification requirements on current account transactions to demonstrate that the transactions are in fact 
legitimate current transactions (Ariyoshi et al, 2000, p.63). More recently some tight controls on foreign 
                                                 
23 In May 2007 the range was enlarged to ± 0.5%. 
24 State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE) is responsible for controlling and monitoring cross-border exchange 
flows and all businesses in foreign currency. 
  16exchange transactions have been loosened, at the same time that tariffs and quotas on imports were reduced or 
eliminated. Such measures in general reduced the quantitative restrictions to the purchase of foreign currencies 
by residents, relaxing the restrictions on extending external guarantee, on issuing bonds in international 
market and on foreign firms’ borrowing in RMB. Chinese authorities have attempted to alleviate recent 
appreciation pressures by easing controls on capital outflows. 
The current level of exchange rate is considered in general devaluated. The real effective exchange 
rate, based on the consumer prices index, had a lot of variations during the last 25 years: it depreciated sharply 
during the 1980s and beginning of the 1990s, due to frequent nominal exchange rate devaluations, and it 
appreciated for a short period until 1997, due to the increase in the inflation. Indeed, RMB was devaluated by 
21% in 1989, 9% in 1990, and 14% in 1994. Since 1997 real effective exchange rate has had a stable trend, 
due to both very low inflation and the stable nominal exchange rate (Figure 17 and 18). The dramatic process 
of foreign reserves accumulation in China – reaching more than US$ 800 billion in 2005 (Table 4) - started in 
the beginning of the 1990s, having in particular a increasing pace since 2000, as a result of the a deliberate 
foreign reserves accumulation policy under a context of increasing trade surplus and the rising of capital 
inflows, mainly FDI.  
Considering the capital flows, it can be noted that there was a dramatic growth of the volume of 
capital flows in China along the 1990s, due mainly the increase of FDI since 1993. Indeed, FDI increased 
dramatically during the 1990s, from US$ 4.3 billion in 1991 to US$ 44 billion in 1997, what made China 
second largest recipient of FDI among all countries. FDI has been attracted by the long-term growth 
perspective of Chinese economy (and increasing exports performance) and also by the fact the since the 
beginning of the reforms China sought to attract FDI. Foreign loans, however, had a low growth in the period, 
what is the result in great extension of the existence of restrictions on foreign debt. Therefore, at the same time 
that China has sought to attract FDI, it also has been very cautious about foreign loans and portfolio 
investments, although more recently such capital inflows have increased markedly, notably  portfolio 
investments and other investments, such as loans, currency and deposits. The pick up in export growth since 
1995 came as a result of a set of factors, such as liberalisation of the exports licensing system, the increasing 
productivity of the industry, the cheap wages and the fall in the effective exchange rate. Overall, the current 
account surplus rose to more than 3% of GDP since 2004 (Table 4).  
 






























As a consequence of the combination of the exceptional trade surplus, the dramatic increase of foreign 
reserves and the low level of external debt, the indexes of external vulnerability of China show a very 
comfortable situation: the external debt-to-GDP ratio has been low and declining in 1990-2004 period, 
reaching only 12.0% in 2004. Further, the long-term debt over total external debt ratio had been higher than 
70% until 2000, an evidence that the maturity structure of the debt is very healthy; more recently the ratio has 
declined due to the increase of external indebtedness, including short-term ones. Other indexes show 
additional evidences of a very good external situation: the external debt to exports ratio declined to less than 
  1750% in 2003, while reserve-to-imports ratio increased of 47% on average in 1990-95 to 102% in 1997 (Table 
4).  
After a short period of high inflation and high interest rates  in the mid-1990s, China has experienced 
low domestic rates and declining inflation and eventually even deflation (Figures 20 and 21). The combination 
of a stable exchange rate (and even a real appreciation in 1994-98), strong labour productivity growth (as a 
result of strong investment rates), trade liberalisation and declining commodity prices exerted significant 
downward pressures in inflation in 1996-2002, while demand factors played a smaller role (Prasad et al, 2004, 
p.14). The reduction in the inflation has been followed by expansionist monetary and fiscal policies in the 
period. China’s fiscal position has been healthy due to the strong economic growth and low domestic interest 
rates, despite the fact that primary fiscal position may appear weaker (Prasad et al, 2004, V). More recently 
fiscal deficit over GDP has declined to 1.2% in 2005. The Chinese authorities have attempted to isolate the 
domestic economy from the consequences of the combination of a fixed exchange rate and large capital 
inflows through sterilisation. The sterilisation of capital inflows has been facilitated by the fact that domestic 
interest rates have been lower than interest rates of industrial country treasury bonds (Prasad et al, 2005, p.12). 
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China, India and Russia, managing their exchange rate regimes with a restrictive capital account 
convertibility, have been, in more or less degree, succeed cases of management of macroeconomic policy – in 
which the stability of exchange rate has a crucial role – that seek to create a stability environment for 
economic growth. In particular China and India’s cases show how is correct to implement a gradual and 
careful management of capital account and policies oriented towards the reduction of external vulnerability. 
These experiences also show that capital controls can be helpful in protecting the economy against the 
destabilising aspects of capital flows and helping to resolve certain types of policy dilemma, such as 
simultaneously managing exchange rate and the short term interest rate. Russia is an interesting case, as the 
economy until 1998 performed very bad, as a result of a chaotic transition process of liberalisation to a market 
economy; after the 1998 crisis the economy has performed very well, due to both the increase in the exports 
and the better management of macroeconomic policy, that has combined a more active exchange rate policy 
and decreasing interest rates, under a context of a partial capital account convertibility. Brazil, on the other 
hand, has adopted a more liberal and orthodox economic policy, that includes a less interventionist approach 
related to exchange rate policy and a very open capital account, that has resulted in higher exchange rate 
volatility, higher interest rates, and a more poor economic performance. Table 5 shows a comparative 
synthesis of the analysis of the macroeconomic policy of each BRIC country. 
Among different factors that are important to the management of macroeconomic policy, this paper 
stressed in particular the importance of reducing external vulnerability, that should be understood not only in 
terms of the external solvency of the country, but also in terms of its vulnerability to external shocks and 
changes in the market sentiment, in which the lower or higher degree of capital convertibility can be a 
essential factor. In this particular concern, the recent experience of the BRICs countries shows the importance 
of having: 
a) A gradual and careful process of capital account liberalisation; 
  18b) Capital management techniques well-designed and dynamic in the sense that policymakers need to 
retain the ability to implement a variety of management techniques and alter as circumstances warrant, but 
most important that they are coherent and consistent with the overall aims of the economic policy regime; 
c) A surplus balance in the current account or a deficit in low level, financed by external capitals with 
the predominance of long-term capitals; 
d) The accumulation of exchange reserves by central bank, in order to avoid speculative attacks on 
domestic currency and also to allow that the monetary authorities enhance their capability to influence the 
effective real exchange rate and to reduce the volatility of nominal exchange rate; 
e) A managed floating exchange regime, according to the specificities of each country, that aims the 
preservation of a competitive and stable real exchange rate as an intermediate target of macroeconomic 
policies oriented to employment and growth objectives. 
 
  Table 5. Exchange rate regime and capital account convertibility of BRICs countries 
Country    Exchange 
rate regim e
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Source: Author’s elaboration based on M ohanty and Scatigna (2005). 
(*)Exchange rate volatility related to 1999-2003, according to Mohanty and Scatigna (2005, Table A2).  
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